Judicial Independence in Virginia by Bryson, W. Hamilton
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 11
1-2004
Judicial Independence in Virginia
W. Hamilton Bryson
University of Richmond School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons,
Law and Politics Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. Hamilton Bryson, Judicial Independence in Virginia, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/11
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN VIRGINIA
W. Hamilton Bryson *
I. INTRODUCTION
The political will of the people of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia is expressed in the Constitution of Virginia, which created
the government of Virginia. Every Constitution of Virginia from
1776 to the present has divided the government among the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia, the legislature; the governor, who is
the chief executive officer; and the judiciary, a system of courts.1
Each of these three branches of the government was created as a
separate, independent branch of the government.2 However, they
are not totally independent; they must of necessity interact. Fur-
thermore, each Constitution of Virginia has put into place various
checks and balances among them.3
* Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1963,
Hampden-Sydney College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1968, University of
Virginia School of Law; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge. The author would like to
thank the Richmond, Virginia law firm of Hunton & Williams, LLP, for a summer re-
search grant which generously facilitated and supported the writing of this article.
1. See, e.g., VA. CONST. arts. IV-VI. A fourth branch of the government, the State
Corporation Commission, was created by the Virginia Constitution of 1902, but this does
not impinge on the subject of this article. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. XII, § 153.
2. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. I, § 5; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. II;
VA. CONST. of 1851, art. II; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. II; VA. CONST. of 1776, art. III.
3. See generally 1 A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA (1974) (discussing the evolution and operation of the Constitution of Virginia);
THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1975) (analyzing the role of the Supreme Court of Virginia in relation to other
branches of Virginia state government); MARGARET VIRGINIA NELSON, A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928 (1947) (discussing the role of judicial review in
Virginia); 4C MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA, Constitutional
Law § 27 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (discussing the interplay between separation of powers and a
system of checks and balances); John Thomas Wren, Republican Jurisprudence: Virginia
Law and the New Order, 1776-1830 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, College of
William and Mary) (on file with the author).
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The purpose of this essay is to consider the constitutional place
of the judiciary of Virginia in relation to the legislative branch of
the government. This is because before the Virginia Constitution
of 1971, the governor was not given a strong position in the gov-
ernment-a reaction to the very strong position of the governor of
Virginia during the colonial period.4
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRANCHES
There are two fundamental constitutional issues that define
the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches
of the government. The first is the independence of the courts to
decide cases brought before them according to the rule of law and
not according to the desires of a single person or of a group of per-
sons, including the governor or the legislature. The law can be
changed by an act of the legislature signed by the governor, but
even so, there are limits.5 The second is the separation of gov-
ernmental powers among the executive, the legislature, and the
judiciary. The General Assembly cannot interfere with the consti-
tutional authority of, and mandate to, the judiciary to determine
cases brought before it for decision.6 Until recently, there have
been only a very few incidents that have raised the issue of the
independence of the judiciary.
In order to preserve the independence of the judiciary, the leg-
islature is forbidden to diminish the salary or term of office of a
sitting judge.' Even the possibility of such diminishment might
influence or intimidate a judge in the performance of his or her
official judicial duties.
4. Compare VA. CONST. art. V, with VA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX.
5. For example, no bill of attainder or ex post facto law may be enacted. VA. CONST.
art. I, § 9.
6. See VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (separating powers among the branches).
7. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9; VA. CONST. of 1776 art. XIV.
[Vol. 38:705
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN VIRGINIA
III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE JUDICIARY
A. Appointment
In 1788, such an incident arose. Even though it was inadver-
tent, the appellate court judges reacted instantly. In early 1788,
the General Assembly attempted to reorganize the high courts in
such a way that it happened that the judges' workload would
have been substantially increased with no increase in pay.' The
judges on the Court of Appeals of Virginia 9 declared the act un-
constitutional because it interfered with the independence of the
judiciary and violated the constitutional provision for the separa-
tion of powers within the state government.1" In response, the
governor called the General Assembly into special session to re-
spond to the problem.1' The result was an amicable compromise.
The courts were reorganized in a different way so that no sitting
judge would be required to accept additional judicial duties,'2 and
the judges voluntarily resigned their commissions in the old
courts and accepted new commissions in the new Court of Ap-
peals. 3 Thus, it was established that an act of assembly could
neither increase the judicial workload of sitting judges nor re-
move them from their judicial offices and that this was a matter
of constitutional law.'4
8. Act Establishing District Courts, ch. 39, § 3, 12 Va. Stat. 535-36 (Hening 1823).
9. The first name of the highest court in Virginia after Independence was the Court of
Appeals of Virginia. Act for Establishing a Court of Appeals, ch. 12, 9 Va. Stat. 522 (Hen-
ing 1778). In 1830, its name was changed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
VA. CONST., art. V, § 1 (1830); see also VA. CONST., § 14 (1776). However, the court contin-
ued to be informally referred to as the Court of Appeals of Virginia. See, e.g., 39 Va. (12
Leigh) (reporting cases as "argued and determined in the Court of Appeals.. ."). In 1971,
the court's name changed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. VA. CONST., art. VI, §1 (1971);
2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 706.
10. Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). This case
may also be found as Remonstrance of the Court of Appeals to the Gen. Assembly, 3 Va. (1
Va. Cas.) 98 (1788). For additional information regarding this case, see 2 THE LETTERS
AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 504 (David John Mays ed., 1967).
11. 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS 440-41 (Wil-
liam P. Palmer ed., 1884).
12. An Act for Amending the Act, Intituled an Act Constituting the Court of Appeals,
ch. 68, 12 Va. Stat. 764 (Hening 1823).
13. See 2 DAVID JOHN MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803: A BIOGRAPHY 273-75
(1952); Margaret V. Nelson, The Cases of the Judges: Fact or Fiction?, 31 VA. L. REV. 243,
246-47 (1944).
14. See generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 692-94 (discussing Cases of the Judges
of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, and its impact on the Constitution of Virginia).
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Although it is the constitutional function of the legislature to
make and change the law, interpreting the Constitution, a legal
document, is a matter of law, and the interpretation of the law is
the function of the judiciary.15 Thus, the courts are to review the
acts of the other branches of the government as a matter of con-
stitutional law.16 One aspect of Virginia constitutional law is the
separation of powers among the branches of government, and this
requires that the judiciary give great deference to the legislature
when construing a statute. For the judiciary to legislate would be
for the court unconstitutionally to usurp the legislative function
of the General Assembly. A corollary to this principle is that
when confronted by a constitutional issue in a legislative act, the
court should, if it can, resolve the issue without declaring an act
of assembly unconstitutional. A good example of this is the case of
Commonwealth v. Caton.1" This case involved an attempted legis-
lative pardon for treason."8 Edmund Pendleton and the majority
of the Court, with impressive legal skill, avoided the constitu-
tional issue although George Wythe was willing to indulge in an
unseemly constitutional confrontation with the legislature. 9
The only serious clash between the judiciary and the legisla-
tiire in Virginia history took place in the 1870s and 1880s. It was
a major crisis that resulted in the entire Court of Appeals not be-
ing re-elected, but rather being replaced with an entirely new
bench of politically pre-committed justices. The issue was the re-
adjustment of the state debt.2 °
After the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia was faced with a huge debt that dated in
large part from before the War, but the treasury of Virginia had
been looted during Reconstruction. Furthermore, the private sec-
tor of Virginia had been economically destroyed during the War.
The new Virginia Constitution of 1870 looked to universal public
15. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 25 (1793) (stating that "[tihe interpre-
tation of the laws is the proper and particular province of the courts").
16. See id. at 82-83; see generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 694-95 (discussing ju-
dicial review).
17. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
18. Id. at 8-9; see also Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, ch. 3, § 3, 9 Va. Stat. 168
(Hening 1823).
19. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7.
20. For an in-depth account of the Readjuster Movement, see CHARLES CHILTON
PEARSON, THE READJUSTER MOVEMENT IN VIRGINIA (1917).
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education,21 but there was not enough money to pay for it and
also to pay the public debt or even the interest on the debt.22
Thus, the political issue of the day that divided Virginia into two
hostile war camps was whether to pay the debt, or at least the in-
terest that was due upon it, or to repudiate the state debt, or at
least the interest that had accrued during the hostilities of the
1860s, so that public education and other pressing social needs
could be financed. The Funders wanted to pay at least the inter-
est on the state debt and thereby maintain the financial integrity
of the Commonwealth and thus assure the future access to
credit.23 The Readjusters wanted to scale back the state debt, or
at least the accrued interest, so that much needed social pro-
grams could be available for the people of the Commonwealth,
who certainly needed them at that impoverished and unhappy
time.24
In December 1879, the Readjusters, who were led by General
William Mahone,25 were elected to a large majority of the General
Assembly; and, in 1882, all of the justices of the Court of Appeals
came up for re-election, but none of them were re-elected. 26 The
sitting justices were thought to be Funders, and the bondholders,
who were led by William L. Royall,27 were arguing that the read-
justment of the state debt was an unconstitutional abridgment of
vested contract rights.2" Thus, in order to assure the judicial ap-
proval of the legislation scaling back the state debt, the General
Assembly elected an entirely new court of judges who were known
to be Readjusters. 29 Since 1788, there had been no attempted leg-
islative interference with the judiciary until this.3"
21. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 3.
22. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 111-12.
23. Id. at 115-16.
24. See JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES 1867-1879: A STUDY IN
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 233-55 (1970); see also ALLEN W. MOGER, VIRGINIA:
BOURBONISM TO BYRD, 1870-1925, at 37-38 (1968).
25. See MOGER supra note 24, at 37; see also NELSON MOREHOUSE BLAKE, WILLIAM
MAHONE OF VIRGINIA: SOLDIER AND POLITICAL INSURGENT (1935).
26. NELSON, supra note 3, at 118.
27. See generally WILLIAM L. ROYALL, SOME REMINISCENCES 100-09 (1909) (recount-
ing the dispute between the Funders and the Readjusters).
28. See William L. Royall, Constitutionality of the Funding Bill, 2 VA. L.J. 129, 146
(1878); William Green, The Funding Act, 2 VA. L.J. 193, 194-209 (1878). But see JAMES
LYONS, THE FUNDING BILL: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL (1878); JAMES MOORE, TWO PATHS TO
THE NEW SOUTH: THE VIRGINIA DEBT CONTROVERSY, 1870-1883, at 17 (1974).
29. NELSON, supra note 3, at 110-20.
30. Geo. L. Christian, The Judicial Term of Office in Virginia, 4 VA. L.J. 1, 14 (1880).
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The denouement was that, at first, the bondholders appeared
to have lost the fight, but, ultimately, they changed their legal
tactics and the Supreme Court of the United States upheld their
rights.3' By 1894, when the Court of Appeals of Virginia came up
for re-election again, the Readjusters had lost their political
power, and the General Assembly refused to re-elect any of those
judges-putting in an entirely new bench of justices again.32
Whether this wholesale change in the personnel of the Court
was an attempt to intimidate the judges or to manipulate the re-
sults of future litigation, or whether it was simply a matter of
crass political patronage, it was regrettable. The judicial selection
process should be aimed at putting the most talented and well-
educated legal minds on the bench in furtherance of the admini-
stration of impartial justice. The performance of the General As-
sembly in 1882 was poor. In terms of judicial independence, it
was a disgraceful episode.
Even though it was a poor performance, there are some consid-
erations that help put the matter into perspective. The Court of
Appeals before 1870 was only infrequently presented with consti-
tutional issues to decide.33 However, from then on, litigants put
many constitutional cases before the judges, and, before 1882,
several had involved the state debt issue.34 The courts cannot
avoid hearing a constitutional case. The courts are open to every-
one who can pay a nominal filing fee or get the court to waive it.
This includes foreigners as well as citizens, with the exception of
enemies of the state. It is the courts' purpose, the reason for their
existence, to decide issues of law. The constitution is a legal
document, and if a litigant argues that a statute is void because it
is unconstitutional, the courts must decide the issue one way or
the other. Thus, the Court of Appeals was drawn into the politi-
31. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 693 (1890). See generally John V. Orth, The
Virginia State Debt and the Judicial Power of the United States, 1870-1920, in
AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 106 (David J. Bodenhamer &
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984).
32. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 22-23. To avoid such a wholesale turnover in the highest
court of the Commonwealth in the future, the Virginia Constitution of 1902 provided that
the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals would be elected in staggered classes. See VA.
CONST. of 1902, art. VI, § 91.
33. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 12-13; NELSON, supra note 3, at 32.
34. See, e.g., Clarke v. Tyler, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 134 (1878); Wise Bros. v. Rogers, 65
Va. (24 Gratt.) 169 (1873); Antoni v. Wright, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 833 (1872); see also
NELSON, supra note 3, at 113-19 (discussing litigation regarding state debt).
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cally sensitive issue of the state debt by the general public and
could not have avoided the difficulties. Even though the General
Assembly had been elected expressly to readjust the state debt,
the legislature and the general public were still bound by the con-
stitutions of the United States and Virginia. The legislative ma-
nipulation of the courts in 1882, however well intentioned, was an
attempt to manipulate the course of justice, and statesmen would
have acted otherwise.
B. Removal from Office
In seventeenth century England, the independence of the judi-
ciary was severely threatened by the arbitrary removal of judges
from their places in court." Having judges who are independent
from the politicians and who can adjudicate according to the rule
of law is a political right that was hard fought against the crown.
The king finally was forced to accept this principle with the Act of
Settlement of 1701.36 The Virginia patriots were well aware of
British constitutional history, and this concept of judicial inde-
pendence was firmly embedded in the first Constitution of Vir-
ginia in 1776, which required that the appellate judges, once
elected by the General Assembly, shall "continue in office during
good behaviour."
3 7
The Virginia Constitution of 1851 took away what was the
equivalent of life tenure of the judges and provided for a term of
years.38 At the same time, it also took away the election of the
appellate judges by the legislature and made all judges subject to
election by the general voting populace.39 One member of the
35. See W. H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER: ITS JURISDICTION
ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES AND RECORDS 52-57 (1975); Alfred F. Havighurst, The Ju-
diciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles H, 66 L.Q. REV. 62, 76-77 (1950); C. H. MclI-
wain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 217, 219 (1913).
36. An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the Rights
and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, § 3, cl. 7 (1701) (Eng.); see also W. S.
Holdsworth, The Constitutional Position of the Judges, 48 L.Q. REV. 25 (1932).
37. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV; see also VA. CONST. of 1830, art. V, § 1.
38. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 10.
39. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34. See generally ROBERT P. SUTTON,
REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 126-27, 152-53
(1989) (discussing the evolution of the judiciary in Virginia); Alex B. Long, An Historical
Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL.
691, 730-66 (2002) (providing an overview of the historical development of Virginia's judi-
cial selection process).
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Convention argued for this in order to make judges independent
of the legislature.40 He thought that the legislative election of
judges violated the general principle of the separation of govern-
41 tmental powers. It is to be remembered that, at that time, the
county courts had administrative as well as judicial duties within
their counties and could levy local taxes. It was thus a reform
long overdue at the county court level. Whether it was a good idea
at the appellate court level is highly questionable.
The Constitution of 1870 made all of the judges of Virginia sub-
ject to election by the General Assembly. They were to be elected
for a term of years with the possibility of re-election-the terms
being reasonably lengthy. 43 The reason for this return to the for-
mer system of selecting judges was that the legislators wished to
use the judgeships for the purposes of political patronage.4 It is, I
believe, only coincidental that, at this time, the administration of
the counties was taken away from the county courts and put into
the hands of locally elected boards of supervisors.45 This system of
judicial selection has continued to the present. 6
This system of judicial selection provides a political check on
the judiciary by the legislature. There is a periodic review of all
judges by the General Assembly which balances the judges' power
to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional. Where both
sides act with statesmanship, the system works extremely well.
The bad example is the Readjusters' refusal to re-elect any of the
sitting judges in Virginia in the late nineteenth century.47
Not only is the Virginia judiciary subject to election and regu-
lar, i.e. predictable, re-election by the legislature, it is also theo-
retically liable to removal by the General Assembly through the
40. Waitman T. Willey, Speech Before the Committee of the Whole (June 20, 1851), in
WAITMAN T. WILLEY, SPEECHES OF WAITMAN T. WILLEY OF MONONGALIA COUNTY, BEFORE
THE STATE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, ON THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION; ON COUNTY
COURTS & COUNTY ORGANIZATION, AND ON THE ELECTION OF JUDGES BY THE PEOPLE 34-42
(1851).
41. Id.
42. VA. CODE ch. 47, § 11 (1849); id. ch. 53, §§ 3-5; 2 VA. CODE REV. ch. 191, § 6
(1819).
43. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13, and 14.
44. MADDEX, supra note 24, at 92-93.
45. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VII.
46. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. VI, §§ 91, 96, 99. See generally 2
HOWARD, supra note 3, at 739-46 (discussing the selection ofjudges).
47. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 110-20.
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impeachment process.4 ' The Virginia Constitution of 1776 pro-
vided for impeachment of judges by the House of Delegates with a
subsequent trial in the Court of Appeals. 9 The Constitution of
1830 moved trials upon impeachments to the Senate of Virginia
where a two-thirds vote was required for a conviction and re-
moval from office.5° This latter procedure has been included in
every constitution since 1830.1 In addition, the Constitution of
1830 provided for the legislative removal of judges without a trial
upon a two-thirds vote of both houses of the General Assembly."
This provision continued in force until the 1971 Constitution.5
3
The impeachment procedure originated in England.5 4 The fa-
mous impeachments of several judges in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were well known to the drafters of the first
Constitution of Virginia. The most notable were: Sir Francis Ba-
con, lord chancellor;55 the judges who ruled in favor of the ship
money tax;56 and the Earl of Macclesfield, another lord chancel-
lor.57 Even though major political motives guided all of those im-
peachments, nevertheless, the founding fathers of Virginia be-
lieved that this legislative power was a desirable check on the
judiciary. It is to be remembered that, under the constitutions of
1776 and 1830, the judges held office during good behavior, which
meant, in effect, for life, but for the possibility of impeachment.5"
No judge of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the new Court of
Appeals of Virginia has been removed from the bench either by
impeachment or by legislative recall.59 However, there have been
two removals of lower court judges. In 1903, Judge Clarence
48. VA. CONST. art. TV, § 17. See generally 1 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 552-58 (dis-
cussing impeachment in Virginia).
49. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. XVII.
50. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 13.
51. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 17; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IV, § 54; VA. CONST. of 1870, art.
V, § 16; VA. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 18.
52. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. V, § 6.
53. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. VI, § 104; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 23; VA. CONST. of
1851, art. VI, § 17.
54. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1-4 (1973);
see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3 (2d ed. 2000).
55. 1 F. HARGRAVE, STATE TRIALS 375 (1776).
56. Id. at 505, 696-719.
57. 6 F. HARGRAVE, STATE TRIALS 477 (1777).
58. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. V, § 1; VA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV.
59. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 58.
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Jackson Campbell, judge of the County Court of Amherst County,
was removed from the bench by legislative recall for assaulting a
preacher who had insulted him.6° Charles H. Crawford, a Baptist
preacher, who was the agent of the rabid Anti-Saloon League of
America, publicly defamed the judge because he granted a liquor
license to a pharmacist, and the preacher, when he refused to
apologize, was made to feel the sharp impact of the judge's horse
whip.6' Complaints were lodged in the General Assembly, and
Judge Campbell's judicial career came to an end.62 In 1922, the
people of Amherst County elected him to the House of Delegates;
one of his committee assignments was the Committee for Courts
of Justice.63
In 1908, Judge John Wise Gillet Blackstone of the Circuit
Court of Elizabeth City County was removed by legislative recall
for dereliction of his duties by failing to appear in court when it
was opened for the day's sitting. ' Everyone knew very well where
the judge was, and the sheriff went there to remind him that the
court was awaiting his appearance.65 However, Judge Blackstone
refused to leave the house of prostitution where he was staying.66
In the words of the report of the House of Delegates Committee
for Courts of Justice:
[The sheriff] again found him alone in bed at the same place [a house
of ill-fame in the town of Phoebus]. Whilst the sheriff was in the
room several lewd women entered in their night gowns. One of the
women got on the bed occupied by Judge Blackstone; whereupon the
sheriff smacked her and told her to get out of the way .... 67
This was a public scandal which caused a local furor; petitions
were sent to the General Assembly, and the judge was removed
from the bench.'
60. 1902-04 VA. SENATE JOURNAL 331-35, 444-52, 490, 568-74, 649, and 677; 1902-
04 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 436-43, 447-49, 600-07; ANSWER OF C. J.
CAMPBELL, Va. Gen. Assembly, S. Doc. No. 7, at 2-10 (Reg. Sess. 1903).
61. 2 DICTIONARY OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY 559-60 (Sara B. Bearss et al. eds., 2001).
62. Id. at 560.
63. Id. at 559-60; see also E. GRIFFITH DODSON, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 1919-1939: REGISTER INCLUDING MEMBERS OF 1933
CONVENTION 225 (1939).




68. See 1908 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 379-83, 716-21, 1023-31; 1908 VA.
SENATE JOURNAL 941-46; see also Brooks M. Barnes, The Sins of John W. G. Blackstone
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In 1871, Judge Alexander Mahood of the Fourteenth Judicial
Circuit was accused of being drunk while sitting on the bench as
a circuit court judge. 69 However, insufficient proof was offered,
and the House of Delegates voted against his removal.7 °
Again, in 1944, the legislature attempted to remove a judge;
this time it was Judge Alonzo B. Carney of the Circuit Court of
Norfolk County. The first attempt was to get the Supreme Court
of Appeals to declare him to be incapacitated. 7' However, the
court ruled that there was no showing of any physical or mental
incapacity, and the court suggested that the constitutional proce-
dures for judicial removal should not be circumvented by using
the statute as a ruse.72 The House of Delegates then voted to re-
move him on the ground that he had agreed with his predecessor
that, if he would retire, he, Carney, would share his salary with
him. However, the Senate refused to follow, and the judge re-
mained on the bench. v
Perhaps the reason for the infrequent use of the impeachment
process is because it is politically and procedurally cumbersome.
Except in the most outrageous situations involving public scan-
dal, it is easier simply to allow an unworthy or incompetent judge
to finish his or her term of office and then not re-elect. This
means that the General Assembly does not have to deal with an
unpleasant situation. However, the local bar has to stand be-
tween the unfit judge and the general public to ameliorate the
bad situation which will soon come discreetly to a quiet end.
14, 31-32 (Apr. 29, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Historical So-
ciety).
69. 1870-71 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 146, 183.
70. Id. at 231, 308, 346.
71. See Act of Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 441, § 5, 1942 Va. Acts 706.
72. See In re Carney, 182 Va. 907, 908-10, 30 S.E.2d 789, 789-790 (1944).
73. See 1945 VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES JOURNAL 259-63.
74. See 1945 VA. SENATE JOURNAL 190-91.
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IV. STRIKING A BALANCE
To resolve situations of judicial misbehavior without having to
resort to a legislative impeachment, the Virginia Constitution of
1971 provided for the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.75
This allows the judiciary to regulate itself.76 The Commission,
which is elected by the General Assembly, hears complaints
against judges and investigates them.7 7 If the investigation re-
veals facts that warrant further action, the Commission prose-
cutes the judge in a formal trial before the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.78 The court then hears evidence and argument and may
reprimand or remove the judge from office. 79 Under the firm lead-
ership of Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, this procedure has been
very effective in assuring that the reputation of the Virginia judi-
ciary stands high.
Since 1942, there have been statutes which provide for the re-
moval of judges by the Supreme Court of Virginia for physical or
mental incapacity ° and which provide for a mandatory retire-
ment age.81 In both cases, there are provisions for pensions.82 The
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,83 which prohibits
generally mandatory retirement ages, does not apply to state
court judges.84
The debate over the place of the judiciary within the govern-
ment centers on two issues-independence and accountability.
The judges must be independent of external influences which will
divert them from their duty to administer justice according to the
75. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
76. See generally 2 HOWARD, supra note 3, at 757-66 (discussing the mandate to the
General Assembly to create the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission); M ORRIS, supra
note 3, at 58-59 (discussing the impact of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission on
removal ofjudges from office in Virginia).
77. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
78. Id.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17.1-900 to -913 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
80. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-912 (Repl. Vol. 2003); Act
of Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 441, 1942 Va. Acts 705.
81. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9; VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-305(B1) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
82. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.1-306, -308 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
84. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,473 (1991).
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rule of law. The judges must be accountable if they fail to do this.
However, accountability to personal or political interests is wrong
where it deflects or perverts the judges from the disinterested
and impartial pursuit of the rule of law.
The administration of the law does not allow for judicial legis-
lation where the law is clearly settled. For the judges to be able to
change the law whenever they individually, personally feel it ap-
propriate is to upset expectations retrospectively and also to de-
stroy the law as a system; the judges would be putting themselves
above the law. Litigants frequently raise issues of law, the resolu-
tion of which is in doubt; if the matter were clear, reasonable par-
ties would have settled their legal disagreements out of court.
The courts cannot refuse to decide difficult issues of law and leave
the parties to settle their disputes by a fistfight. However, when
the law is clear, for the judiciary to say that it is otherwise would
be an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative function of
the General Assembly. However, if a statute is unconstitutional,
it is not the law, and the courts must so declare it. This fre-
quently places the courts in difficult positions.
Just as the legislature is not above the law, neither are the
judges. Ignorant, foolish, and corrupt judges should be held ac-
countable. Then, the question is to whom should they be account-
able. The proponents of popular election of judges argue that the
judiciary should be directly accountable to the voters, just as are
the other branches of the government.8 5 However, a generally un-
educated populace with its natural proportion of moral depravity,
as is that of the United States, is not competent to know when a
judge is not proceeding according to the rule of law. Therefore,
popular opinions as to judicial elections will be improperly ma-
nipulated by partisan politicians trying to create a political power
base, by the news media trying to sell advertising through sensa-
tional journalism, or by sinister persons for private and selfish
motives.
In many states, judges run for election and re-election as part
of a national political ticket. However, political preferences
should not govern the issues of the administration of the rule of
law or judicial corruption. Politics are irrelevant to such concerns.
The news media frequently oversteps the bounds of responsible
journalism and attempts to control the outcome of pending litiga-
85. Long, supra note 39, at 702-10, 718-23, 742-49.
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tion. Whatever the underlying motive might be, the threat of a
media campaign against a sitting judge who is subject to re-
election should not pervert the course of justice. One of the worst
examples is the conviction of Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard in Cleve-
land, Ohio.86 The local newspapers decided that Dr. Sheppard was
guilty of killing his wife, a prominent socialite, and a campaign of
publicity was launched to have him convicted. The judge was due
to be re-elected shortly after the trial, and the prosecutor was
running for election to a different judgeship. Public pressure
was brought to bear upon the trial procedure, and the defendant
was convicted of murder.8" A federal court found that the news-
paper publicity was so powerful that the defendant was denied
his right to a fair trial, and the conviction was ultimately over-
turned. 9 Examples of media pressure can also be found in Vir-
ginia. In 1898, the judge of the County Court of Norfolk County
was attacked by the press as being favorable to criminals because
he was affording accused persons their constitutional rights:
The misdoings of the alleged criminal referred to in the editorial
complained of, were, at the very time of the publication, under inves-
tigation. There was a difference of opinion as to whether the locality
of the crime was in Norfolk city or Norfolk county. The manifest ten-
dency of such a publication, at that time, was to influence and affect
the judgment of the public, from whom the trial jury was to be se-
lected; to embarrass, obstruct and impede such investigation; to in-
fluence, direct and control the final result.
90
In that case, the editor of the newspaper was convicted of
criminal contempt of court. 9'
The balance between the freedom of the press and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary is clearly stated by Judge Prentis in
that case: 
92
Under every form of government, which is able to maintain its own
existence, there must always be somewhere a sovereign authority
86. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See generally PAUL HOLMES, THE
SHEPPARD MURDER CASE (1961) (providing a more detailed account of the Sheppard case).
87. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342.
88. See id. at 335.
89. See id. at 335-36.
90. Elam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. Cir. 536, 536-39 (Cir. Ct. 1898) (Norfolk County).
91. Id. at 536, 541.
92. Judge Robert Riddick Prentis later became Chief Justice of Virginia and predeces-
sor of Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 64, 166, 170, and 174.
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with power to enforce all of its own decrees. Under our system the
people themselves claim and hold this ultimate sovereignty. From
them the courts and all the other departments of the government de-
rive their limited powers. The sovereign people express their will or
law through their agents, and when expressed all citizens owe it
their respect and allegiance.
The courts, by the will of the sovereign people, are intrusted with so
much of this ultimate sovereignty as is necessary for the due admini-
stration of justice. Any attack upon them, therefore, certainly while
in the act of administering justice, is an attack upon the sovereign
people, whom the courts simply represent and serve. It is an assault
upon the government which the people have ordained. Of course as
to his private conduct and affairs, the judge cannot be accorded any
special privilege. He must defend himself from unjust aspersions
here just like other men. Not so when he is exercising his official du-
ties. The sorry spectacle of a judge descending from his high public
place to vindicate his official conduct, either by personal violence or
by a suit for damages, would be unseemly and intolerable. A wrong
committed against him thus in his public capacity is a wrong to the
government he represents. It should be punished not as a private in-
jury, but as a public wrong. So contempts of court have always been
treated, and so it must continue if the courts themselves are to con-
tinue. The judge, by the very nature of his office, is of necessity con-
stantly placed in positions of antagonism to those whose rights he
determines. His judgments necessarily cross and thwart the pur-
poses of unsuccessful suitors. He should, as a matter of public policy,
therefore, be protected by the whole power of the State from the ma-
licious assaults of disappointed litigants, as well as from attacks,
criticisms and influences which would, in advance, direct and control
his judgments for selfish and evil ends.93
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution of Virginia makes the judiciary independent
of the other branches of the government.94 As for accountability,
the popular election of judges sounds good in theory, but in prac-
tice it has proved to be a mistake. The preferable alternative is
the present system of accountability to the legislature and to the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. The legal history of
Virginia has proved these to be effective ways of dealing with
situations of public scandal while protecting the impartial ad-
ministration of the rule of law.
93. Elarn, 13 Va. Cir. at 536-537.
94. See VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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The General Assembly has not politicized the judiciary by us-
ing its re-election process to re-adjudicate or review the judges'
administration of the rule of law as to any particular legal or so-
cial issue.95 The result is that the Virginia judiciary is fortunately
independent of party politics when it performs its duties. It would
be destructive of judicial independence if the legislature were to
politicize the re-election of judges. If it were to do so, it should ex-
pect that its judiciary would join in the political process. The dec-
laration of its statutes as unconstitutional would become routine,
and the separation of governmental powers would be upset. It
would also seriously damage the foundation of our society, which
is the rule of law. It is thus imperative that the legislature and
the judiciary continue to respect the separate governmental roles
of each other.
95. The only exception took place long ago, when the Readjusters resorted to court-
packing politics in the 1880s. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 116-20.
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